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The literature on the Averch-Johnson (A-J) effect focuses 
on the distortion that is introduced into the capital-labor ratio 
employed by a regulated firm as the resuit of rate of return regulation. 
1 
This paper considers a related question, namely that of the effect 
of rate of return regulation on the mix of labor and capital-augmenting 
innovations produced and employed by a regulated firm. The regulated 
firm is assumed to possess "in house" capabilities for producing 
such innovations, and it is the responsiveness of its innovative 
activities to regulation that is the central theme of this paper. But 
the mix of innovative activities also affects the firm's choice of a 
capital/labor ratio in producing its final product. This more conven­
tional notion of factor bias is also explored in the paper. 
We have considered in detail two specifications of the 
regulatory scheme, one in which all of the fin:n's capital is included 
in its rate base, and a second case in which only the capital employed 
in producing the final product of the firm is eligible for inclusion 
in the rate base. The first case is obviously unrealistic, but it turns 
out that the second can be regarded as a special case of the first, 
so it is convenient to study it before turning to the more realistic 
1. See Baumol, W. and Klevorick (1970). 
case in which the capital employed in producing innovations is 
excluded from the rate base. In addition, it is of some interest 
to see how an alternative specification of the rate base affects the 
pattern of bias in the firm's activities. 
2 
The general conclusions that are presented in this paper 
are the following. The intuitive notion that rate of return regulation 
will tend to bias innovative activities in the direction of higher 
levels of labor-augmenting to capital-augmenting innovations must 
be qualified to take into account the elasticity of substitution between 
augmented capital and labor in producing the firm's final product, 
and the dependence of the output of innovations on the levels of 
technical progress already achieved by the firm. When all of a 
firm's capital enters the rate base, the relative capital intensities 
of the firm's innovative activities also play a role in determining 
the direction of bias. Generally speaking, when capital and labor 
are relatively poor substitutes for one another in producing the final 
product, and when the output of innovations is relatively insensitive 
to the state of progress already achieved, then the expected distortion 
in the production of innovations occurs. But the expected distortion 
will be reversed for a range of values of the elasticity of substitution, 
this range depending on the sensitivity of innovative outputs to the 
levels already achieved. Interestingly, the distortion in the capital/ 
labor ratio employed in producing the final product occurs indepen­
dently of the size of the elasticity of substitution, so that the traditional 
A- J distortion is preserved even when innovations are included in 
the regulated firm's activities. 
The conclusions that are derived in the paper all relate 
to steady states for the firm along a balanced growth path where 
factor prices and capital/labor ratios in all the firm's activities are 
constant over time. This provides a rough comparability with the 
usual static versions of the A-J model. 
3 
The Model 
The model employed is of a monopolistic firm which produces 
a final product that is sold in a regulated market. The firm also has 
"in house" capabilities to produce innovations that augment the labor 
and capital employed in producing the final product. L and K refer 
to labor and capital respectively, while w and r are the wage rate 
and the rental rate, Y is output, with p (Y) the inverse demand 
function facing the firm. A(t) is an index of capital productivity at 
time t, while B(t) is the corresponding index applied to labor. The 
allowed rate of return per dollar of capital is s. A distinction is 
drawn among the uses to which capital and labor are put, with K1 
denoting capital employed in producing the final product; K2, capital 
employed in producing capital augmenting innovations; and K3' capital 
used to produce labor-augmenting innovations. A similar notation 
is employed with respect to labor. 
The Case Where All of the Firm's Capital Appears in the Rate Base 
We consider first the case where the rate base of the firm 
is K, the total amount of capital employed by the firm. 
The firm's problem may be formulated as follows: 
1"' 
-lit 
max [p(Y)F(AK1, BL1) - wL - rK)e dt 
(j 
subject to 
A ¢(A, Kz, Lzl 
B = 'i!(B, K3, L3) 
p(Y)F - wL � sK 
A(o) = A , B(o) 
0 
B
0 
where 
Let 
L L1 + L2 + L3, K = K1 + K2 + K3' Y = F(AK1, BL1
) . 
-6t H = [pF - wL - r K ]e + A. 1
¢ + A.2 V + A.3 [sK - pF + wL]
First order conditions are given by: 
oH -6t (1) oK = [(MR)F 1A - r] e + A.3[s - (MR)F A] = O 1 1 
oH -6t (2) oLl = [(MR)F 2B - w](e - A.3) = O 
oH -6t (3) - = - re + A. ¢ + A. s = 0 oK2 · i K 3 
oH -6t (4) oL = - we + A.1¢L + A.3w = 0 2 
oH -6t 
(5) K = - re + A.2 VK + A.3s = 0 0 3 
oH - 6t (6) oL = - we + x2vL + A.3w = 0 3 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
( 10) 
' oH -6t 
A.l = - oA = -[(MR)F.lKl(e - A.3) + A.1¢A) 
• oH -6t 
Az = - oB = - [(MR) F2L l (e - A.3) + A.2vB]
A =¢ 
B = V 
with transversality conditions lim A. 1 
t�oo 
= 0, lim A.2 = O. 
t -> 00 
( i2_ o F _ oF )MR = p + ydY ' F l =o(AKI)' F2 -o(BLl) 
We will work with the special case in which 
lim p(Y) = + 00, 
Y->O 
lim p(Y) = 0, � < 0, Y ;;.: O. 
Y�co y 
4 5 
Further it is assumed that F, ¢ and v are well behaved neoclassical 
production functions. In particular, F is homgeneous of degree k > 1 
in AK1, BL 1, while ¢ and v are homogeneous of degree one in Kz, 
L2, and K3 , L3 respectively. 
Thus 
where 
Further, 
with 
while 
where 
k 
F(AK1, BL1) = (BL1) F(v l' 1) 
k 
= (BL l) f( v l) 
AK 
v - 1 . 1 - BLl, f(vl) F(v1
, 1) 
f'(v1) > 0, f''(v1) < 0 for v1 <'= 0 
lim £'(v1)=+oo, 
v ->o 
lim f '(v1 ) = 0. 
1 vl ->"" 
Similarly , assurn.e that 
¢(A, K2, L2) = a(A)G(K2, L2) = a(A)L2g(v2), 
'l!(B, K3, L3) = y(B)H(K3, L3) � y(B )L3h(v 3), 
Kz K3 
v2=L' v3= L · 2 3 
g and h are assumed to possess the same neoclassical properties 
2 as f. 
2. Separability of¢ and tis asi:umed in order to simplify the 
analysis of the dependence of A and B on the levels of A and B already 
achieved. 
. 6t Ot . 6t Final ly, let µ 1 = t..1 e , µ2 = x.2e , µ3 = x.3e • Then the 
first order conditions ( 1 )-( l 0) can be rewritten as follows . 
( l "') 
(2 "') 
(3 ') 
k-1 (MR) (BL1) f ' A (l -µ3 ) + µ3s-r = 0 
k-1 
] ((MR) (BL1) (f-v1£')B-w (1-µ3)  = 0 
-r + µ.1 O!g' + µ.3 s = 0 
(4') µ.1 O!(g-v2g') -w(l - µ.3 ) = 0 
(5') -r + µ.2yh' + µ. 3s = 0 
(6') µ.2y(h-v3 h')-w(l -µ.3 ) = 0 
(7') µ, 1 = 6µ.1-(MR) (BL1)
k-l f'K1(
1-µ3 J-µ.10!'L2g 
(8') µ, 2 = 6µ.2-(MR) (BL1)
k-l(f-v1f')L1(1-µ.3 )-µ.2y
' L3 h 
(9') A= O!L2g 
(10"') B = yL3 h 
l' -M lim -6t with transversality conditions 
t 1�"' µ. 1e = O, t-.;;."' µ2e = O. 
6 
As in the t raditi ona l A-J literature, we assume that the 
rate of return constraint is strictly binding at eac h point in time in 
the sense that s is strictly less than the rate of return for the 
unregulated firm. Hence µ. 3 > 0 for all t. Further, concavity of 
Hand R ( = pF) implies µ.3 < 1. 
3 
Then from (l ' ) - ( 6 ' ) we obtain 
w(l -µ.3 ) 
r-µ. 3 s 
= 
(f-vl f' \ B 
= 
g-v2g' 
£' I A g' 
h-v h' 3 
h' 
. oH -l)t 3. Note that (2) can be written asaL = (RL - w) (e - A.3 )  so ci2 H -6t 1 that --2 = RLL (e - A.3) < 0, RLL < 0 implies µ.3 < l. Clearly, oL1 
conditions weaker than concavity of H can also be used to establish 
that µ.3 < l .  
Alternatively, 
A(£"' \_ g' _ --1!.: 
B £-v1f' ; - g-v2g "' - h-v3h' 
Since 
r 
w 
µ 3 (s - r ) 
--- <L (1-µ. 3)w w • 
d 
dv2 
( . g' 
� 
g-v2g)= gg"" . 2 < 0, ( g-v2g ' ) 
with 
7 
d 
d v3 ( h' ) 
hh" < O; = 2 h-v 3 h' h-v3h')
d 
dv1 
� f, 
J 
££"'' < 0= 
2 • f-v 1 f' . 
. (f
-v 1 f') 
it follows that for any given levels of A, A, B, B, Y, the usual A-J 
distortion occurs, with capital/labor ratios in innovative activities 
and the augmented capital/augmented labor ratio in producing the 
fina l product exhibiting over-capitalization, gi ven that 0 < µ.3 < 1, 
r < s < r , where r is the rate of return for the firm in the 
max max 
absence of regulation. 
But we are interested Jnstead in the responsiveness of the 
level of innovative activities of the firm to the existence of a 
rate of return c onstr aint . We will examine this in the simplest 
possible setting, namely one in which the capital/ la bor ratios in all 
of the firm's activities are assumed to be constant over time; thus we 
are explicitly restricting our ana lysis to a steady state balanced 
growth pat h of the firm. Assuming s, w, r are constant over time, 
then the existence of a steady state implies that �2 = �3 
= 0, together 
K B • 
with q1 = 0, where q 1 = __l • Note that q 1 =A v1 so that q 1 = 0 implies 
that 
Ll 
& . �AB-BA�- 0 
Avl
+v
l 2 -A 
thus 
B ·  B A  · A B 
[ ( . ·)� (
. 
') 
A v 1 + v 1 B - A = O or v 1 = v 1 A - B • 
S i nce 
w(l-µ.3) = (f-v! f "j B
= r-µ.3s f J A 
g-vz
g" 
---
g" 
h-v h"' 
3 
h"' 
are identities in t ,  it  follows that 
w(s-r)µ. 3 
. 2 
(r-µ.3 s) 
..:.s.C 
. 
hh"',. = 2 v =-
--- � 
(g") 
2 (h" l 3• 
Thus �2 
=; 3 = 0 implies that µ,3 = O. Further we have 
(f-v £] • • - ff" B • 1 AB-BA --v + --- - 0 
(f"')z A 
1 £"' AZ -
along a balan ced growth path. 
Thus v 
( " " ) v� =crf � - � 
8 
where crf is the elasticity of subs titutio n between augmented capital 
and labor in producing the final product of the firm. 
Then 
q1 (A BJ q; = (crf-l) \A - BJ 
so that the con d ition q1 = 0 implies either that the productio n 
function F is Cobb-Douglas or that the percentage rates of incr eas e 
in capital and labor augmentation are eq ual. 
These conclusions are the usual ones found in the factor 
bias literature (see Samuelson (1965)). But there is an additional 
conditi on on the rates of technical progress that follows from 
profit maximization. Since (3") is an identity in t, then along 
a balanced growth path with w, r, s constant we have 
Thus 
µ 101g"' + µ.1g"'01"'A = 0 
µ. l 
-µ.101"A 
OI 
Combinin g this with (7"') we hav e 
k- 1 (MR)f"K1(BL1) (
1-µ.3) = 5µ.1 µ. .. 
µ.l ... . 
101 Lzg +� 0/ 
Since A = Cl'L2g, it follows that 
hence 
k-1 (MR)f'(K1) (BL1) (1 - µ.3) = 5µ.1• 
Similarly, differentiating (5"') with respect tot we obtain 
µ.2yh"' + µ.zh"'y"'B = 0, 
µ.2 = -
:::L._ B • µ.2 y 
Combining with (8"') we hav e 
k- 1 ::L. . (fy!R) (£ - vlf"') Ll (BLl) (1 - µ.3 ) = 5µ.2 + IJ.2 y B - IJ.z y"'L3h 
so that 
k-1 (MR)(£ - v1f
"') Ll (BLl) (1 - µ.3) = 5µ.z. 
9 
10 
Hence 
� - �l.j 
µ.l � ql = µ. 2 = CYg" 
from (3") and (5") so that 
fr - v 1 f"\ � 
q 1 = \ £" I CYg -
A (w(l - µ. 3� 
B r - µ. 3s J 
�
CYg,. • 
Thus 
_5_ = ft:._ J3\+ y
"B _
CY' i.. 
q1 \B Bl y CY 
Along a balanced growth �ath'. q1 
= 0 .. Thus 
.
crf /:. l implies that along 
a balan ced growth path, ! = � and y�B = CY�A , which implies 
� CY'A 
y 
=
--;-
,. BHence ::t. =�A • Thus along a balanced growth path CY CY 
withcrf/:.l, 
-
(w(l - µ. 3� 
ql - r - µ.3s } 
y"h" 
CY"g" • 
Let w * = 
w( 1 - µ. 3) 
with w , r - µ.3s 
w 
r Since 0 < µ.3 <l, 0 < r < s, thus 
* (l) > (l). 
Comparative Dynamics 
We will examine the effects of rate of return regulation on 
the innovative acti vitie s of the firm by considering the impact of an 
* increase in w on the steady state magnitudes characterizing the firm. 
It should perhaps be mentioned that A, A, B, B are all time dependent, 
even under s�eadY, state conditions. However, asswning crf /:. 1 
implies that ! = � along a steady state balanced growth path, so 
that B/ A is constant along such a path. 
Note that 
Thus 
* ( f ) B w = f" - vl A. 
Ad(B/A) =_l _ _ 
(__!_)J:_ dvl • 
B * * cr v  * dw w f 1 dw 
A Further, since v1 = B ql, 
so that 
1 dvl 
vl dw* 
A d(B/A) _ _5. 
__!__ dql _ A d( B/A) 
q * B * I dw dw 
B * -cr- 1 dw f 
l 
* w 
(.l...).l... �crf ql dw * 
Morever, 
1 dql --
* ql dw 
ql 
A * yh" 
13w CY°?" 
__!__ Bd(A/B) �:llit.f..sil .!Ld(h'/g') 
* + A * + * + h' * • w dw Y dw dw 
From the first order conditions we have 
* h _ _g__v 
w =h,. -v3-g" 2 
11 
so th at 
dv3 
,, 
dOJ 
-(h;)
2 dv2 _ .:Jd = 
hh; ; ' �- - gg;; dOJ 
Further, for any t, 
while 
d(B/A) = B (�;B _ �1A) �:::-dOJ A '' ·.-dOJ dOJ 
� = .Y. (::L._ dB(t) _ ex' dA(t)) '' a y  '' ex '' dOJ dw dOJ 
= (y_) (::L._) Ad( B
_
(, A) + y_ dA(":
) [::L._ B _ ct'] 
ct y ··· et ··· yA et dOJ dw 
Since ::L..l?. y 
ex; A 
-- along a balanced growth path, 
Ci 
Hence 
�
* dOJ 
= y:A d(B�� ) = .� d(�/,�) 
(
 y:B
) · 
-;!-
dq; = l,� _ � d(B�:�) + � d(B/,�) ( �) 
l dw OJ dOJ Y dOJ 
l 
+ --­�' 
w + v2 
I 
,, OJ + v 3 
Solving, we obtain 
_l_ d(B/A) (I + y'B/y - 1) = __'.L (_!__) 
(B/A) * a - 1 a - l * dOJ f f w 
l ( 1 l l )
- -;;-:-T * + * - >:< • f OJ w + v2 OJ + v 3 
12 
and 
� d(B/A) 1 
(B/A) >:< dOJ (crf - 1 ) + (\
B _ i) 
�:< OJ (v2 - v3) 
+ >:< >:< (OJ + v2) (OJ + v3) 
(af - 1)
�' 
dql w 
�< ql dw 
w':' (v
2 
-v 3) 
* �:� 
(w +v
2
)(w +v3) 
( - (a - 1 ) \ 
(cr,
- 1 )
£
+ (\B- � 
(a1 - 1 ) + af (y'B/y - 1 ) + 
( , (crf -1) + yy
B
- 1) 
These are admittedly rather complicated expressions and 
deserve some interpretation. First, .note that B = y(B)L3h, so 
. BoB � that if K3' L3 are held constant, B oB = y • Thus
Y: B ( = a: A) is the elasticity of the output of labor augmenting 
innovations with respect to the level of such augmentation already 
achieved, for given inputs of capital and labor into the innovative 
process. 
13 
We assume the usual S-shaped curve of techn ical progress 
as in figure 1 ,  with the corresponding y(B) function in figure 2.
In figure 1, the slope of th e B(t) function increases to the 
inflexion point t':' and falls thereafter. The corresponding y(B) 
function is concave, as shown in figure 2. But y(B) concave implies 
that y' <�, that is, the slope of y at any point Bis always less than 
the slope of a line drawn from the origin to the curve y(B) . Hence 
::L..1?. < 1 .y 
B 
* 
B 
B 
------- ------
I
I 
I
l
I
I 
I 
I 
* 
t 
Figure l. The B(t) function 
t 
* 
B 
B 
Figure 2.. The y(B) function 
14 
d(B/ A) 
d
ql . 
�' and--; depend upon three properties of the 
dw dw 
fi rm ' s tec hnol og y : 
( l) the elasticity of sub s ti tution between augmented labor 
and augmented capital in producing the final product of the firm; 
(2.) the relative capital intensities v2 and v 3 in too production 
of capital augmenting and labor augmenting technical progress; 
(3) the e la stic ity of output of innovations with .respect to the 
level of pr og r ess already achieved. 
* 
15 
An increase in w (say due to the imp osi tion of rate of return 
regulation) tends by itself to bia s the hir ing of inpu ts so as to 
increase the capita l/ labor ratio, and tends to bias innovations toward 
labor augmenting (B) at the expense of capital augmenting (A) innova­
tions, But to the extent that capital augmen ting innovations are more 
capital intensive than labor au gmenting innovations, the t e nd ency 
towards this bias is offset; and the ease of substitution between aug­
m e nt ed labor and capital in the final p r oduct acts to influence such 
a bias as well, Finally, the higher the ela s ticity of output of innova­
tions with respect to the level already achieved, the less will the 
bias show up in the patterns of hirings and innovative activities of 
the firm. 
In particular, assume that v2 = v3 -- the c ap it al intensities. 
. b h . . t" . . "d . l Th d( B/ A) 0 f in ot innovative ac iv1tle s are i ent1 ca • en * > or af 
dw 
sufficiently small; but the bias induced by .regu lation leads to 
d(B/A) ti dql 
* 
< 0 for l < af < 2 - y • In contrast --; > 0 for all values dw dw 
of "f -- a reversal of the "expected11 A-J bias can occur only 
because of differing capital intensities of the innova tive processes. 
16 
The special case where v2 = v 3 is of some interest, because 
it turns out that the " realistic " case where only K1 appears in the 
rate base is equivalent (in terms of q ualitative properties) to the case 
where v2 = v3• 
The Case in Which Only K1 Appears in the Rate Base 
Assume that only capital employed in producing the final 
product of the firm appears in its rate base, while costs incurred 
in innovative activities are considered a deduction from revenue in 
calculating allowed profits. Using the notation above, the problem 
becomes 
max/[ p(Y)F(AK1,BL1) - wL - rK] e- bt dt 
0 
subject to 
A= ¢(A,K2, L2) 
B = $(B, K3, L3) 
<. p(Y)F - wL - r(Kz + K3) =sK1 
In terms of output per unit of labor production functions, 
the first order conditions for this problem are the following. 
* k-1 * * (1 ) (MR) (BL1) f"A(l - µ.3 ) + µ.3 s - r = 0 
* k-1 * (2 ) ((MR) (BL1) (f - v1f') B - w) (1 - µ.3 ) 
(3*) 
* 
(4 ) 
(5*) 
( 6*)
* ... * µ.1 otg - r( 1 - µ. 3 ) = O 
* * 
µ.1 ot(g - v2g') - w(l - µ. 3 ) = 0 
* ... * µ. 2 y h - r( l - µ. 3 ) = O 
* * µ.2 y(h - v3h') - w(l - µ.3 ) = 0 
0 
(7*) * µ. l = bµ. l 
(8*) * µ.2 = bµ.2 
* . 
(9 ) A= ot L2g 
* 
* 
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k-1 , * * , (MR) (BL1 ) f K1(1 - µ.3 ) - µ.1 ot L2g 
k-1 * * , (MR) (BL1) (f - v1f') L1(I-µ.3 )�iJ.z y L 3h 
"" 
(10 ) B = Y L3h, 
together with 
lim 
t ->O) 
* -M 
µ.le =0, 
. * -M llm µ.2 e = O. 
t->"' 
�� * 
It will be noted that the conditions ( 1 ) - ( 10 ) are identical to 
�· * 
(l ') - (10 ') except that in (3 ) and (5 ), s is replaced by r. The 
expected results occ;..r so far as factor distortion is concerned, along 
a balanced growth path. That is, 
g - v2g' h - v h' 
w = � 3 
B f - v l f' 
A f' 
g' h" 
* 
w(I- µ.3) 
* r - µ.3 s 
=w 
* 
> W• 
Hence capital and labor are employed in the proper cost minimizing pro­
portions so far as innovative activities are concerned while there is a dis­
tortion in the augmented capital/augmented labor ratio in the final product.
If w, r, s are constant over time, we have 
' , , 
w = 0 - .::.KlL...:... 
• - hh, , 
- (g'J
2 v2 = 
(h')
2 �3' 
so that v2 and v 3 are constant over time for any given w = ; • 
In contrast to the case where all capital enters the firm1s 
' . . 
rate base, balanced growth (v2 = v3 = q1 = 0) does not necessaril y 
imply that µ3':' = O. Ins.tead.' we will explicitly assume that along a 
balanced growth path, � = � , and q 1 = 0. This implies that 
. * 
µ, 3 = o. 
We consider the impact on (B /A) assuming w 
�'
increases, 
w':' d( B/A ) with w held fixed. Thus --1-- , measures the impact on the 
(B A) dw "' 
factor bias in innovations of rate of return constraint. Because w 
18 
is held fixed, v2 and v 3 are not affected by the rate of return regula­
tions. Using the same approach as in the previous section, we obtain 
af - 1 w ':' d (B/ A) 
(B/A) d w* (af- l)+ ( Y�B- 1) 
>:< 
dql w -- ... 
� dw�' 
(af - 1 ) + of(y'B/y -
1) 
(of- l) + (\B - �
Note that when only K1 enters the 
�' (v - v ) 
h h . l " 
w 3 2 
dv2 
rate base, --.. _ 
dw
''' 
vanish from the ence t e terms invo v1ng ,, ,,, 
( w"' + vz) (w'" + v3 )
dv3 
�:� 
dw 
corresponding expressions derived for the case where all capital 
enters the rate base . So far as the effect of the restriction of the 
0 
rate base to K1 on factor bias is concerned, dropping K2 and K3 from 
the rate base has an effect only if v2 lo v3 • It follows that with only 
. d(B/A) . d(B/A) 
K1 in the rate base, '" > 0 for small values of of with , < 0 d ' >i< w dw 
'B dql 'B 
for 1 <a < 2 - .Y.....Q --• .  _ > 0 for all values of af and .Y.....Q , s o  f Y dw''' Y 
long as y(B) is concave. 
Note that the A-J bias induced in q1 by rate of return 
regulation could, in fact, be reduced or perhaps eliminated by 
including all of the firm 1 s capital in its rate base, so long as 
19 
v2 > v 3 and af is sufficiently large (or v2 < v 3 with af sufficiently 
small). On the other hand, the factor bias in inputs used in 
innovative activities only appears if K2 and K3 are in the rate base. 
Finally, it n1ight be noted that the specification of the firm's 
decision problem in the case where only K1 enters the rate base 
assumes that the regulating authority can, in fact, identify the costs 
of the firm's innovative activities and allows only such costs as a 
deduction from revenues. If the regulated firm instead is permitted 
to include in its allowable costs any purchases of innovative inputs 
from its wholely owned subsidiary, with prices chosen by the subsidiary 
in a profit maximizing fashion, then the firm can achieve a monopoly 
price-quantity position; rate of return regulation turns out to be 
ineffective. 
Conclusions 
Rate of return regulation reduces the effective cost of capital 
relative to that of labor for a regulated firm. This induces a bias 
in the capital/labor ratio chosen by the firm . When the firm produces 
innovations as well as its final product, rate of return regulation 
induces a bias towards labor augmenting innovations relative to 
capital augmenting innovations, except for a range of values of the 
elasticity of substitu'tion in producing the final product. The typical 
A-J effect occurs so far as the capital/labor ratio chosen to produce 
the final product is concerned. 
These results hold when only capital employed in producing 
the final product enters the rate base. If all of the firm's capital 
enters the rate base, then the extent of distortion in the firm's activitie s 
induced by regulation depends on the elasticity of substitution in the 
final product, the capital intensities of the innovative activities of 
the firm, and the elastic ity of innovat ions with respect to the level 
of prog ress already achieved, 
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